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Thank you.  It is a privilege to be here at Seton Hall this morn-
ing and to have this opportunity to speak with you.  As Randy indi-
cated, I am the Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, and for 
those of you who are unfamiliar with this position, I will give you a 
brief overview of my responsibilities.  I report directly to the Secretary 
of State and advise her on issues relating to potential violations of in-
ternational humanitarian law.  My position is unique in the world in 
that the United States is the only government that maintains a posi-
tion at the ambassadorial level focusing exclusively on war crimes is-
sues.  My office has responsibility within the State Department for 
monitoring atrocities globally, as well as for monitoring transitional 
justice mechanisms, such as international, hybrid, and domestic war 
crimes courts. 
In relation to ongoing crises, or to accountability processes, we 
have lead responsibility for formulating U.S. government policies, 
which we obviously do in conjunction with other components at the 
State Department and with the U.S. government as a whole.  And, as 
my title suggests, I have a diplomatic role, engaging other govern-
ments on our policies and generally advocating for greater account-
ability for war crimes. 
As Randy mentioned, my educational and work background is 
primarily in the justice sector, having served as a State Prosecutor in 
New Orleans, a Federal Prosecutor in Washington, and then for 
seven years at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY).  I have also spent years working in the area of 
post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, with a focus on rule of 
law and security issues.  I served in field assignments in Iraq, in Kos-
ovo and in other places throughout the Balkans, and then at the Na-
tional Security Council (NSC).  My portfolio encompassed these is-
sues, first as Director for Stability Operations, and then in my last job, 
as Special Assistant to the President, and Senior Director for Relief, 
Stabilization, and Development.  And it is from this combined justice 
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sector, reconstruction, stabilization perspective that I want to speak to 
you today, highlighting the integral role of rule of law in post-conflict 
reconstruction and stabilization efforts. 
As we have seen time and time again, the establishment of rule 
of law and a secure environment is critical to the success of any post-
conflict intervention effort.  Without a secure environment, every-
thing else fails; it is impossible to educate children, to foster an econ-
omy, to deliver health care, to reliably provide essential services like 
water and electricity, and most significantly, perhaps, to establish sta-
ble political institutions. 
Everyone is familiar with the challenges that the United States 
has faced in Iraq, where creation of a secure environment has been 
elusive.  While the scale of the problems in Iraq is daunting, the chal-
lenges faced there are not unique.  We have seen similar challenges 
on almost every continent and in every post-conflict or peacekeeping 
mission in the last fifteen years.  The lesson is the same: if we do not 
get rule of law and security right, nothing else will work. 
To focus on this, I will talk a little bit today about my personal 
experiences working in the field, highlighting how the failure to plan 
or to act has hampered stabilization efforts.  I want to then lay out for 
you some of the thinking on how the U.S. government, and in fact 
the broader international community, might approach these issues in 
the future. 
As I mentioned a moment ago, after working as a prosecutor in 
the United States, I was posted by the Department of Justice to the 
ICTY.  As a trial attorney there, I supervised investigations, drafted 
indictments, and then tried cases in court.  I also was tasked with a 
fair amount of pseudo-diplomatic responsibilities, acting as an inter-
locutor on behalf of the ICTY with political figures, military leaders, 
and security services in the Balkans. 
In carrying out these duties and in supervising investigations, I 
spent approximately half of my time at the ICTY on the ground in the 
region.  Starting in 1994, while the war was still in full swing in Bos-
nia, through the Kosovo conflict in 1999, and on to 2001, I had the 
opportunity to be there both in the periods of ongoing conflict and 
as the various post-conflict missions were established.  During the last 
year of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, in 1995, there was 
little support for the ICTY’s work, and absolutely no willingness by 
U.N. forces to arrest indicted war criminals, who admittedly were few 
in number at that time. 
When the NATO Mission was deployed to Bosnia, at the begin-
ning of 1996 in the aftermath of the Dayton Accords, we at the ICTY 
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hoped that there would be a more robust approach by peacekeepers 
toward war criminals, who were moving around freely throughout the 
country.  For the first year and a half when NATO was on the ground, 
though, they refused to undertake any arrests.  The most oft-cited 
reason for not acting was that it was not in NATO’s mandate to effect 
arrests.  Fundamentally, though, it boiled down to concerns about 
force protection—that arrests would generate retaliatory attacks 
against NATO troops.  The result was that many of those who had 
triggered the war in the first place, and who had been responsible for 
the worst atrocities, continued to be active, if not fully in the open, 
then barely under the surface.  This was obviously counter-productive 
to the international efforts to stabilize Bosnia, and it sent a clear mes-
sage that rule of law was a secondary concern. 
Another peacekeeping mission was established in Eastern Croa-
tia simultaneously to the one set up in Bosnia, and this one was 
headed by an American diplomat named Jacques Klein, who made 
clear to the ICTY that he would order forces under his command to 
arrest any indicted war criminals found in the area he controlled.  I 
had coordinated investigations in this region of Croatia, so I worked 
closely with Klein to execute the arrest of one of the individuals I had 
indicted.  He had, by that time, moved to Serbia, so we hatched an 
elaborate plan to lure him back across the border, at which time he 
was arrested by Polish troops.  We bundled him onto a Belgian Air 
Force plane and flew him to The Hague.  It soon became clear that 
the much-feared reaction from the population was not going to ma-
terialize.  There were a few incendiary news articles, and the Milosevic 
government declared me and two investigators persona non grata for 
our role in the kidnapping, but that was basically it. 
Three weeks later, British NATO troops in Bosnia undertook the 
first arrest there.  In one operation the suspect was killed in a shoot-
out.  Yet even that failed to ignite retaliatory actions against NATO 
forces, or even any significant unrest.  Soon other arrests followed, 
and it quickly became a standard practice for NATO to detain in-
dicted subjects.  The result was that many of these spoilers—those 
disruptive to the stabilization efforts—either ended up in prison or 
had to go underground to evade capture.  This made a very positive 
impact on the overall political dynamic in Bosnia, but it came a year 
and a half later than it should have because key actors in the stabiliza-
tion and reconstruction efforts thought we could get by without con-
fronting these issues head on. 
NATO and the U.N. worked diligently to apply lessons learned 
in Bosnia to their planning for the Kosovo Missions, which were es-
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tablished in the aftermath of the bombing campaign in June 1999.  I 
was involved in certain aspects of this planning as the ICTY represen-
tative.  NATO and the U.N. were fully committed from the outset to 
arresting war criminals in Kosovo, although we thought it very 
unlikely that any of the senior Serbian officials indicted by the ICTY 
would be found there. 
We at the ICTY were much more concerned about the preserva-
tion of evidence and securing mass graves, objectives that NATO 
shared and committed to try to achieve.  I spent much of the war in 
Albania, running the ICTY Operations in Tirana, and then went in 
with NATO troops on June 12, 1999.  Within days, despite all of our 
advanced planning, we were completely overwhelmed as reports of 
mass graves and other evidentiary sites proliferated. 
As to the mass graves, we had lined up forensic teams from a 
number of countries to do exhumations, but it would take weeks to 
get them on the ground.  In the meantime, we needed NATO troops 
to secure the sites.  There simply were not enough troops to do this, 
nor to keep the troves of documents from being pilfered. 
The inability, despite the best of intentions, to support the 
ICTY’s work was only the tip of the iceberg.  U.N. advance elements 
that entered Kosovo with NATO had no operational law enforcement 
personnel, so NATO troops were doing all policing.  There were no 
functioning courts.  So again, NATO took on responsibility for this to 
the extent they could, having military lawyers review the circum-
stances of detentions made by troops in the field.  Most of those de-
tained were caught red-handed looting or committing acts of vio-
lence.  But very soon NATO soldiers were getting approached by 
people throughout Kosovo who wanted to identify individuals in their 
communities who had committed war crimes during the course of 
the bombing campaign—a very different, and more complex, polic-
ing challenge. 
I got pulled into this exercise by NATO, asked to review all of 
these complaints.  Pretty soon, we were getting hundreds of such 
complaints.  I started every day in Kosovo at the NATO Force Com-
mander’s staff meeting, which was also attended by the incoming 
U.N. Police Commissioner, who was at that point a police force of 
one.  The NATO Commander harangued him every day about when 
U.N. civilian police would start arriving.  In the end, it took several 
months for any appreciable U.N. police presence to get deployed, 
throughout which time NATO troops continued to perform virtually 
all law enforcement functions, diverting them from virtually every 
other responsibility they had. 
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For the remainder of 1999, the international community re-
mained focused on getting police on the ground, paying little atten-
tion to the other components of the justice system: the courts and the 
prisons.  It is a mistake that has been repeated time and time again in 
post-conflict settings with disastrous results.  For if a justice system is 
to be effective, the three principle components of that system—
police, courts, and prisons—must be developed simultaneously and at 
the same rate.  If the police are arresting fifty people on a given day, 
you must have a prison system that is capable of processing fifty new 
prisoners and a court system that is capable of handling fifty new 
cases.  An analogy that I have often used is that it is like a three-
legged stool.  If any one of the legs is shorter than the others, the 
stool will collapse. 
In Kosovo, as in many other settings, everyone focused on get-
ting civilian police on the streets in order to relieve the military of law 
enforcement responsibilities.  But without a truly functioning court 
system, and with only rudimentary prison facilities, any good work the 
police did was lost when it came time to move to the next stage of the 
criminal justice process.  Although the U.N. Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) was set up in 1999, these problems were still not rectified 
in late 2001, when having left the ICTY, I returned to Pristina as the 
Director of the UNMIK Department of Justice, the functional Minis-
ter of Justice for the U.N.-administered province. 
What I found when I took this position was that the Department 
of Justice was really a hodge-podge of different offices, including the 
courts, the prosecutors’ offices, missing persons, forensic operations, 
and the prison system.  They had all been set up in an ad hoc fashion 
over the preceding two years, as needed to deal with issues as they 
arose.  There was no strategic thinking behind the creation of the 
various components.  There was no coherent structure which defined 
it as a unified entity, and there was no top-down coordination of its 
diverse functions.  My highest priority then became transforming this 
mess into a coherent, functioning ministry of justice that could even-
tually be turned over to local Kosovar control. 
My efforts in this regard were the first attempts to do something 
like this in the two years that UNMIK had been running Kosovo.  
Throughout that time, the police were a well organized entity, with a 
clear chain of command and clear operational protocols. Although 
one could argue how effective UNMIK police were, at least there was 
a recognizable structure there, and the police functioned in a man-
ner roughly consistent with other forces throughout the world.  The 
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same could not be said for the other justice components, which were 
still barely recognizable as such. 
The fact that it took two years to address this fundamental short-
coming shows the extent to which people simply did not understand 
the concept of rule of law.  Getting bad actors off the street is a prior-
ity, but it is not an end in and of itself.  To his credit, Ambassador 
Menzies, when he became U.S. Chief of Mission in Kosovo, saw fixing 
this as a high priority, and he played a pivotal role in pushing for the 
changes that were needed.  Other NATO governments got squarely 
behind this initiative as well, because they too came to recognize that 
unless something was done about the instability in Kosovo, their 
troops would be stuck there for a very long time.  The only viable so-
lution to this problem was a robust, comprehensive justice system. 
During my tenure in Kosovo, we initiated the first war crimes 
and organized crime prosecutions to be brought in local courts.  Us-
ing international judges and prosecutors working alongside Kosovar 
jurors, we were able to make some progress, at least signaling that 
there would be no impunity and we would go after even the most sen-
ior figures.  I do not want to overstate the achievement here.  We cer-
tainly did not eradicate organized crime in Kosovo, but we made a 
start. 
The bottom line is that, in order to stabilize a country or region 
in the aftermath of conflict and to establish effective rule of law, it 
takes a sustained effort.  There is a constant turnover of people in 
missions like this.  Some of my successors as Director of Justice pur-
sued the same path aggressively and launched prosecutions.  Some of 
the Police Commissioners were very interested in this; others were 
not.  So it was a mixed bag.  But when a country’s institutions have 
been totally destroyed, when criminals have been given free reign, 
when the concepts of what is right and what is wrong have been 
turned upside down, it cannot be repaired overnight.  It highlights 
one of the most difficult challenges of any international intervention 
in a crisis zone.  The nature of these missions is such that very few 
people are there for the duration of time it takes to mount a sus-
tained effort to stabilize.  Like me, many come for one year; some for 
even less.  By the time I took the job in Kosovo, I had already spent 
seven years in the Balkans.  I had been working in post-conflict envi-
ronments throughout that whole time period, so I knew how to oper-
ate in this environment.  I had a very small learning curve. 
Most who went there had to learn about a place they had never 
been, and whose culture was completely alien to them, not to men-
tion the difficulty of transferring their experience and skills from 
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domestic jobs into the supercharged post-conflict crisis environment 
in which they found themselves now working.  By the time they would 
finally learn about the place and how to do their jobs there, it was 
almost always time for them to rotate out.  With this ongoing dy-
namic, it is extremely difficult to mount and sustain a stabilization ef-
fort, but it is what we encounter every time we enter into one of these 
scenarios. 
The problem has been compounded by the fact that over and 
over post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations have 
been organized in an ad hoc fashion.  I once heard Senator Biden 
describe it like this: every time we go into a post-conflict or peace-
keeping situation, we do it like it is the first time it has ever hap-
pened, and when we shut it down, we act as if it is never going to 
happen again.  This has been true, not only of the United States, but 
to an extent of the international community at large.  Even the 
United Nations, with its sizeable Department of Peacekeeping Opera-
tions (DPKO), has very few standing resources that can be applied to 
any given crisis.  They have to be assembled as each situation presents 
itself, particularly in the security and rule of law sectors. 
I left Kosovo at the end of 2002 with these lessons fresh in my 
mind, coming back to Washington and posting at the White House 
on the National Security Council staff.  When I first started at the 
NSC and was going through my entry interviews with Dr. Rice, who 
was then the National Security Advisor, and her Deputy, Steve Had-
ley, they picked up on my post-conflict work and asked me to look at 
how we, the U.S. government, could do a better job of preparing for 
and fielding civilian responses to post-conflict or crisis situations. 
My general approach was to suggest sort of a U.S. government 
equivalent of U.N. DPKO that could enhance U.S. participation in 
U.N. peacekeeping missions, NATO missions, or interventions by the 
United States and other interested states.  Because of my direct ex-
perience, I felt strongly that the most robust component of a standing 
civilian response mechanism should be in the rule of law area.  The 
proposal that I worked on, combined with the work of many others, 
eventually led to the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization, known by its acronym, S/CRS. 
My good friend John Herbst is here, who is the Coordinator, and 
I am sure you will be hearing much more about this later today.  
While S/CRS has experienced a rather bumpy start, particularly in 
terms of funding and the growing pains of any new office fighting for 
bureaucratic turf, it is moving forward with plans for development of 
a civilian reserve.  Composed of on-call experts in many fields who 
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can be readily deployed to a crisis zone, this would provide the U.S. 
with a standing response capability that thus far we have only had on 
the military side.  Simply getting people into crisis zones who have 
had experience working in these types of environments will be a huge 
help.  Significantly, the initial tranche of the reserve would be in the 
rule of law and security sectors. 
U.S. efforts to create this sort of capability have not gone on in 
isolation.  A number of other governments, including the United 
Kingdom, Germany, and Canada, have launched similar initiatives 
over the last few years and have, in some instances, advanced beyond 
the United States in implementation of their plans.  Likewise, the 
United Nations has undertaken reforms to improve civilian peace-
keeping capabilities and to build in a more dependable rule of law 
and policing component.  The European Union is also engaged in 
similar efforts. 
My experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo and later in Iraq were not 
unique.  The frustrations I encountered in rule of law field opera-
tions were shared by many others from other governments and from 
the United Nations in a myriad of post-conflict settings.  Like me, 
they came out of these situations with a determination that the whole 
approach could be improved significantly.  They have gone back to 
their respective countries and international organizations pressing 
for change. 
So, the more governments that do this, the better.  It is also vi-
tally important that these types of undertakings not be limited just to 
North America and Europe.  Having strong regional actors in Latin 
America, Asia, and particularly Africa, will strengthen any framework 
that is created, and the more robust a framework there is for re-
sponse, and the more diverse it is, the more it will benefit all of us. 
My comments thus far have focused on the difficulties associated 
with establishing rule of law in post-conflict environments, with anec-
dotes about what can go wrong when it is not established.  In a very 
general sense, I have laid out the prescription that the international 
community seems to have adopted: better pre-planning, more robust 
standing capabilities, and development of a pool of experts who can 
apply their experience to contingencies as they arise around the 
world.  These changes will not fix all of the problems; the challenges 
are too complex and vary too much from situation to situation.  But 
these measures will help all of us do a better job responding and in-
creasing the odds of long-term success. 
A key indicator of success will be how we deal with transitional 
justice issues, the generic term used most often to describe mecha-
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nisms for addressing war crimes and other large-scale atrocities.  This 
is the specific area in which I now focus as Ambassador for War 
Crimes Issues.  In the time left to me, I would like to turn to this spe-
cialized area within the broader rule of law world and discuss the 
United States’s perspective on this issue. 
In general, I think it is fair to say that it is necessary to focus re-
sources on transitional justice for years following a conflict.  What I 
am talking about here is confronting those crimes that were at the 
core of a given conflict—the ethnically driven murders, the large-
scale massacres, the political assassinations.  The legacy of these 
crimes hangs over countries long after the fighting has stopped. 
To cite a specific example in Bosnia, following the International 
Court of Justice verdict in the Bosnia-Serbia genocide case, national-
ist rhetoric briefly returned to a height not seen in several years.  The 
situation has remained tense since then, and we now see Bosnia per-
haps at its most fragile point since the Dayton Accords were signed in 
1995.  The verdict, once again, brought to the fore old grievances 
that had never been addressed adequately. 
Recognizing that a prior violent conflict is one of the strongest 
indicators of risk for future conflict, dealing with these grievances is 
not only a factor for short-term stabilization, it is also a key preventa-
tive measure for renewed hostilities.  One key element of this ap-
proach is the establishment of judicial or non-judicial mechanisms 
for dealing with those who may have committed atrocities.  I believe 
that this is an essential tool because it contributes to the overall stabil-
ity of a post-conflict society.  It decreases the likelihood that small in-
cidents will escalate into broader patterns of violence, and it creates a 
deterrent effect.  If done successfully, it imbues in the local commu-
nity a sense of confidence that the judiciary—i.e., non-violent 
means—can set things straight, and can mete out justice without re-
sort to retaliation or settling of scores. 
Firmly setting the precedent that people are held to account for 
atrocities they have committed is a valuable tool to have when in-
variably something goes wrong.  Going back to my example of Bosnia, 
if an individual or small group commits an inter-ethnic hate crime, 
there is a smaller chance of escalation into a larger conflict if the af-
fected population feels that it can turn to some judicial system, be it 
local or international, and successfully seek redress. 
To a lesser extent, but certainly not an insignificant one, success-
fully prosecuting war criminals deters potential perpetrators.  While it 
is difficult for practical reasons to cite specific cases of individuals 
who are deterred from committing crimes, it is relatively simple to 
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point out instances in which a strong record of accountability might 
have had a partial deterrent effect.  And as I mentioned earlier, it also 
removes certain individuals from active participation in the political 
process, thus diminishing their ability to act as spoilers in the overall 
stabilization and reconstruction effort. 
In an aftermath of a conflict or crisis in which crimes were 
committed on a massive scale, the United States’s first preference will 
always be for the domestic justice system to handle cases that arise.  If 
the system is robust enough, it may only require financial assistance, 
technical support, or international advisors.  But if this sort of assis-
tance would enable the domestic system to work effectively, it is to 
everyone’s benefit to let justice be addressed through existing struc-
tures. 
We recognize, however, that in many situations the domestic sys-
tem will be so weak, or so affected by recent events, that it cannot 
dispense justice fairly.  In those circumstances our next preference 
would be to create some sort of hybrid system, mixing domestic and 
international capabilities.  This could manifest itself along the lines of 
the Kosovo model I discussed a few minutes ago, one in which inter-
national judges and prosecutors are inserted into existing domestic 
courts, serving alongside local jurists. 
Another model with the hybrid approach is to create a stand-
alone court, made up of mixed international and local actors, per-
haps even with a different substantive and procedural law governing 
it.  This is the approach that was taken with the Special Court for Si-
erra Leone, the Khmer Rouge Tribunal in Cambodia, and now with 
the Hariri Lebanon tribunal. 
The final option, if a domestic or hybrid court is not feasible, is a 
purely international court.  This could come in the form of the ICTY 
or the ICTR, the Rwanda tribunal—ad hoc international tribunals 
created by the Security Council.  Frankly though, I think it is very 
unlikely that with the establishment of the International Criminal 
Court, the ICC, that we will see other purely international courts es-
tablished.  So that really leaves the ICC as the international court of 
last resort. 
As I am sure most people know, the United States has had some 
reservations about the ICC, and has chosen not to join the Court.  We 
do, nevertheless, recognize that the ICC has a prominent role in the 
sphere of international justice, and in certain situations it will be the 
most appropriate venue for handling particular war crimes cases.  
Darfur is such a situation, and that is why the United States con-
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curred in the decision to refer that matter to the ICC for investiga-
tion and prosecution. 
Interestingly, the U.S. approach I have just outlined is very much 
consistent with the ICC’s own approach, in which domestic courts are 
seen as the preferable first option, then hybrid courts, which are 
theoretically less expensive and more efficient than purely interna-
tional ones.  In the ICC’s own eyes, they see themselves as the court 
of last resort.  And as I said a moment ago, when other options are 
not viable, then we too will support cases going to the ICC. 
As to the U.S. role in this process, we will continue to actively 
support domestic, hybrid, and international courts with financial and 
technical assistance, with substantive expertise, with information shar-
ing, and with diplomatic engagement.  We are by far the single big-
gest donor for war crimes courts around the world, having contrib-
uted to the ICTY and ICTR alone over $500,000,000.  Where the ICC 
is concerned, we will support referrals of cases and information shar-
ing, where appropriate, but we are constrained by law from providing 
financial or substantive support to the court.  Whether this will 
change at some point in the future, I cannot say, but in any event, 
such a change is not imminent. 
The concept of international justice and accountability for war 
crimes was virtually non-existent as recently as fourteen years ago.  
Since then, we have witnessed the establishment of the ICTY and 
ICTR, the creation of hybrid war crimes courts, and finally, the birth 
of a permanent international court, the ICC.  We have seen Slobodan 
Milosevic, Saddam Hussein, and now Charles Taylor brought to trial.  
While it is still not completely the norm that heads of state be held 
accountable, it is no longer an inconceivable notion, and in fact trial 
now seems like a more likely outcome for such people than does an 
exalted exile in some third country.  I think this reflects the fact that 
there is now a widespread recognition that impunity is a destabilizing 
influence, either in the context of heinous war crimes or common 
street crimes.  Both have to be confronted if we hope to succeed in 
future attempts to stabilize and reconstruct war torn countries.  The 
responses that we apply to these challenges are varied, and they have 
to be because of the wide variety of situations we face. 
Every conflict, every crisis, every country is unique, and thus 
there is never going to be a one-size-fits-all solution.  Yet we can learn 
from our experiences over the last fifteen years and do a much better 
job of preparing for and fashioning our responses to the next crisis 
that presents itself.  Because if anything is certain, there will be a next 
time.  Thank you. 
